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Abstract
In this study we introduce a new stochastic choice rule that categorizes objects in order
to simplify the choice procedure. At any given trial, the decision maker deliberately ran-
domizes over mental categories and chooses the best item according to her utility function
within the realized consideration set formed by the intersection of the mental category and
the menu of alternatives. If no alternative is present both within the considered mental
category and within the menu the decision maker picks the default option. We provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize this model in a complete stochas-
tic choice dataset in the form of an acyclicicity restriction on a stochastic choice revealed
preference and other regularity conditions. We recover the utility function uniquely up to a
monotone transformation and the probability distribution over mental categories uniquely.
This model is able to accommodate violations of IIA (independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives), of stochastic transitivity, and of the Manzini-Mariotti menu independence notion
(i-Independence). A generalization of the categorizing procedure accommodates violations
of regularity and thus provides an alternative model to random utility.
JEL classification numbers: C60, D10.
Keywords: decision theory, random choice, bounded rationality, categorization, considera-
tion sets.
1 Introduction
Categorization has been recognized as an important part of the decision making process. Decision
makers (DMs) categorize in order to simplify complex decision situations (Manzini & Mariotti,
2012). At the same time new evidence suggests that decision makers deliberately randomize when
choosing (Agranov & Ortoleva, 2014). Here we provide a model that connects categorization,
bounded rationality, and randomness in choice. The DM has access to a fixed set of categories
defined as bundles of alternatives and, at any given trial, she considers with fixed probability
one of those categories. Then the DM chooses according to her preferences the best item at the
intersection of the considered category that is available in the menu. The probability of choosing
a particular item in a menu is the sum of the probabilities of all mental categories that have a
∗An earlier version of this paper was circulated with the name of “Random consideration sets: Inferring
preferences from psychological biases” (2015). This paper also subsumes Aguiar (2015a).
†Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, vaguiar@uwo.edu. An important part of this
paper was written as part of my dissertation in Brown University. I am grateful to Roberto Serrano, Geof-
froy de Clippel, Susanne Schennach, Drew Fudenberg, Tomasz Strzalecki, Itzhak Gilboa, Federico Echenique,
David Jacho-Chavez, Anthony Marley, Miguel Castro, Luis Castro and John Rehbeck for useful comments and
encouragement.
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non-empty intersection with the menu and that, even more importantly, are such that there are
no better alternatives within it than the fixed item.
This probabilistic categorization rule allows for menu dependence, and thus is more general
than the popular model of limited attention and random choice put forward by Manzini and
Mariotti(2014) (hereinafter MM), which is characterized among other conditions by a menu
independence axiom on the propensity of considering any given item (i-Independence). It also
allows for degenerate probabilities and, in fact, the proposed model nests the standard rational
model with strict preferences with a categorization rule that consists of considering the category
of all alternatives with probability 1. Stochastic intransitivity is also accommodated, as well as
the similarity effect which represents a violation of the IIA axioms (independence of irrelevant
alternatives).
The random categorization (RC) rule is characterized by the acyclicity of a stochastic revealed
preference relation that consists of declaring a stochastically revealed preferred (strictly) to b if
and only if the probability of choosing b in a menu is changed (either negatively or positively)
by introducing a into such menu (i.e., if a has a non-zero impact in the probability of choosing b
in a menu). The second condition is a total monotonicity requirement that is equivalent to the
Block-Marschak conditions and thus makes our model a subcase of the random-utility model
(RUM). A direct generalization of the main categorizing procedure that allows for category
avoidance (modeled as a signed measure over categories instead of as a probability distribution)
constitutes a new choice rule that is different from RUM. This generalization is able to accom-
modate violations of the regularity condition (i.e., introducing new alternatives to a menu can
only decrease the probability of choosing the existing items).
The random categorization rule is distinct from other efforts to generalize MM and, in par-
ticular, it is neither nested nor does it nest the random feasibility rule proposed by Brady &
Rehbeck (2015). Recently, Zhang (2016) proposes an empirically different categorization proce-
dure that ours, that produces stochastic choice (e.g., the categories in his work are a partition
while here they are arbitrary, among other differences). The author establishes that his rule
is different from previous versions of the categorization rule presented in this paper (Aguiar,
2015a,b). The reader ought to compare the similarities.
Section 2 presents the environment and the dataset. Section 3 describes the representation
of the RC rule and provides illustrations. Section 4 presents the characterization of the RC
rule. Section 5 presents a generalization of this rule that allows for violations of the regularity
condition that is necessary for RUM. Section 6 describes its relation with the literature. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Environment and Dataset
Formally, consider a finite choice setX. There is an always-available option {o} (i.e., not choosing
or a default that is always possible to obtain). A stochastic choice dataset is a set of menus
M ⊆ 2X together with a probabilistic choice map for any given menu and an item inside the
menu: p : X ∪{o}×M→[0, 1]. That is the sequence {A, p(a,A)}A∈M,a∈X∪{o}. The probability
of choice is such that
∑
a∈A p(a,A) + p(o,A) = 1, where p(o,A) denotes the probability of not
choosing anything from A, and thus picking the outside option or default.1 We fix p(o, ∅) = 1.
1The agent may or may not be forced to choose. When forced to choose
∑
a∈A p(a,A) = 1.
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We say that the stochastic choice dataset is complete if M is the power set.
3 The Model: Random Categorization (RC) rule.
Having been given a menu, a DM who follows the random-categorization rule selects a mental
category with a fixed probability and then chooses the item that maximizes its utility from those
alternatives that belong to the considered category and to the given menu. In the event that no
item in the considered category is in the menu, the DM picks the default alternative {o}.
Formally, a DM is endowed with a collection of categories over the choice set X. We take
the categories as given but we do not observe them. Categories are a collection of subsets of X,
formally D ⊆ 2X . The DM has a probability measure defined over the categories that represents
her propensity to consider a given category at any given trial. A probability of consideration is
a mapping m : D 7→ [0, 1] such that ∑D∈Dm(D) = 1 and m(D) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, the DM also
is endowed with a fixed utility function u : X 7→ R that represents her tastes, we assume that it
is injective or equivalently we rule out the possibility of indifference.
When facing a menu, the DM draws a mental category D ∈ D with probability m(D) and
then forms a consideration set Γ(D,A) = D ∩ A. Then she picks a = argmaxb∈Γ(D,A)u(b), the
item that maximizes her utility in the consideration set. Thus under the RC rule the probability
of choosing a ∈ A is given by pRC(a,A) =
∑
D∩A 6=∅:D∈D I(u(a) > u(b)∀b ∈ (D ∩ A)\{a})m(D),
where I(u(a) > u(b)∀b ∈ (D ∩ A)\{a}) is equal to 1 if the condition is true and is equal
to zero if not. Alternatively, we can write pRC(a,A) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D) where
BA(a) = {b ∈ A : u(b) > u(a)} is the set of better than a elements in the menu A.
Definition 1. (Random Categorization rule -RC) A stochastic choice dataset has a Random
Categorization rule representation if there is a triple u, m and D that are the injective utility
function, the probability of consideration map, and the mental categories respectively, such that
the probability of choosing a ∈ X in a menu A ∈ M, is the cumulative probability of all
categories that produce a consideration set where a ∈ A is the best element available:
pRC(a,A) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D).
Finally, the probability to choose the default is pRC(o,A) =
∑
A∩D=∅m(D).
Summarizing, the probability to choose a ∈ A under the RC rule pRC(a,A) is equivalent
to the probability that the DM considers a ∈ A but does not considers any alternative that is
better than it. By definition
∑
a∈A pRC(a,A) + pRC(o,A) = 1.
There are two important special cases of the RC rule, namely the standard rational model
(without indifference) and the MM model of consideration sets with menu independence.
Example 1. (Standard Rational DM) A standard rational DM has probability of choice pSR(a,A) =
I(u(a) > u(b)∀b ∈ A), for an injective utility function u : X 7→ R and the indicator function I(·).
Clearly, this is a RC rule with categories D = {X} with probability m(X) = 1 and the with
same utility function u.
The MM model is also a special case of the RC rule.
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Example 2. (MM stochastic consideration with menu independence) The MM model of con-
sideration set consists of an attention parameter γ : X 7→ (0, 1) and a utility function u : X 7→ R
such that pMM (a,A) = γ(a)
∏
b∈A:u(b)>u(a)(1− γ(b)). In this case, the categories are comprised
of all possible subsets of X including the empty set (which has positive probability), D = 2X
and the probability of consideration of the categories is m(D) =
∑
A⊆D(−1)|D\A|(
∏
a∈X\A(1−
γ(a))), which the reader can verify generates pRC(a,A) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D) =
γ(a)
∏
b∈A:u(b)>u(a)(1 − γ(b)). The fact that γ is non-degenerate implies that the support of
m is the whole power set 2X , or alternatively that the categories include all elements of the
power set. Further discussion of the relation of the RC rule and MM is provided in the sequel.
Of course, the RC rule, allows for probabilistic datasets that cannot be accommodated by
neither the rational model or the MM model.
Example 3. (Categorization) Consider the choice set X = {a, b, c, d}, such that u(c) > u(a) >
u(b) > u(d) with categoriesD = {{a, c, b}, {a}, {b, d}}. We let the map m : D 7→ (0, 1) be
any non-degenerate probability over the categories, for all D ∈ D. Then we give the DM the
menus A = {a, c, b}, B = {a, d, b}, we have: (i) pRC(a,A\{b})/pRC(a,A) = m({a})/m({a}),
(ii) pRC(a,B\{b}) = m({a, c, b}) + m({a}), and (iii) pRC(a,B) = m({a}). Finally, (i), (ii) and
(iii) imply that pRC(a,A\{b})pRC(a,A) <
pRC(a,B\{b})
pRC(a,B)
, when m(D) > 0 for all D ∈ D, so i-Independence,
that is a necessary condition for MM, that requires that pRC(a,A\{b})pRC(a,A) =
pRC(a,B\{b})
pRC(a,B)
is violated.
Clearly, this model cannot be generated by a standard rational model (without indifference)
either.
Finally, we provide an example where the RC rule exhibits the similarity effect that is a
violation of IIA. The similarity effect, seem to be a well-established empirical fact (Trueblood
et al., 2013). This effect is usually called a “context effect” in the psychological literature and
it has inspired an important literature on random choice with attributes (for a nice discussion
see (Trueblood et al., 2014; Swait et al., 2014)). The similarity effect is the observation that the
probability of choosing an alternative decreases when another dominating object is introduced
to the menu (this is Tversky’s (1972) similarity hypothesis). Formally:
Definition 2. (Similarity effect) For any a, b, c ∈ X and any B ∈ M we observe p(b,B∪{a})p(c,B∪{a}) <
p(b,B)
p(c,B) .
Example 4. (Similarity Effect) Consider a set of political candidates X = {a, b, c} with
D ={{a, b}, {b, c}, {c}) where {a, b} is the category of candidates who are from region I, the
group of candidates who belong to the ethnic group II {b, c}, and{c} is the group of candidates
who are of religion III. All members of the electorate have the following preferences over can-
didates (quality) u(a) > u(b) > u(c); however the are are restricted in their voting by their
regional, ethnic and religious affiliations. The proportion of voters who belong to ethnic group
II is m({b, c}) = 46 , while the proportion of voters who belong to region I and religion III are
m({a, b}) = m({c}) = 16 respectively. This is an RC rule because, even though the voters care
about the candidates quality, they have subjective restrictions. The probability of choosing
candidates of groups I and III when the group’s II candidate is not participating in the race is
pRC(a, {a, c}) = 16 and pRC(c, {a, c}) = 56 . The probability of choosing candidate a when all
three candidates are running for office remains the same pRC(a,X) =
1
6 while the probability of
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choosing group’s III candidate decreases significantly as a result of the presence of the dominat-
ing candidate from group II pRC(c,X) =
1
6 , recall that u(b) > u(c). This example exhibits the
similarity effect because pRC(c,X)pRC(a,X) = 1 while
pRC(c,{a,c})
pRC(a,{a,c}) = 5.
4 Characterization and Recoverability
4.1 Characterization
Let us begin by defining a revealed preference relation in the context of stochastic choice that
will serve as the basis of our characterization.
Definition 3. (Stochastic revealed preference ) ⊂ X ×X is defined as a  b if and only if
p(b, A ∪ {a}) 6= p(b, A).
In words, an item a is stochastically revealed preferred to b if and only if a has a non-
zero impact on the probability to choose b in any menu. The relation  captures the idea that
introducing a new alternative a in a menu has some form of psychological higher status for her
than b.
Now, we impose a condition on the revealed stochastic preference relation , in the same
spirit as the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP).
Axiom 1. (Acyclicity)  on X is acyclic. i.e. there exists no a1, · · · , an ∈ X such that ai  ai+1
for i = 1, · · ·n− 1 and an  a1.
The relation  is asymmetric but may not be total. This is a standard internal consistency
requirement in revealed preference relations.
The second axiom that characterizes the RC rule is Weakly Decreasing Marginal Propen-
sity (WDMP) of Choice Axiom.
Before stating this axiom we first need to define the successive differences of any probability
of choice.
Definition 4. (Successive differences) Successive differences for p(a,A) for a fixed a ∈ A ∪ {o}
and A ∈M . For the probability p(a,A), define recursively:
∆A1p(a,A) = p(a,A)− p(a,A ∪A1) for A,A1 ∈M,
∆An · · ·∆A1p(a,A) = ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1p(a,A) − ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1p(a,A ∪ An) for all n ≥ 2 and
for all A,A1 · · ·An ∈M.
We are ready to state the WDMP axiom.
Axiom 2. (Weakly decreasing marginal propensity of choice -WDMP-.) For all A ∈ M, and
any {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn the successive differences are non-negative ∆An · · ·∆A1p(o,A) ≥ 0 for all
n ≥ 1.
Now, we describe the WDMP condition. The first difference −∆A1p(o,A) = p(o,A ∪ A1)−
p(o,A) measures the direct impact of adding A1 to a menu A on the probability of choosing
the default o; this impact is required to be non-positive. This condition is usually known as
regularity or monotonicity because this is equivalent to saying that p(o,A) ≥ p(o,B) for A ⊆ B.
Moreover, the marginal impact of adding A1 to a menu that contains A2 (i.e. −∆A2∆A1p(o,A) =
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∆A1p(o,A∪A1)−∆A1p(o,A)) is also non-positive and not weaker in magnitude than the direct
impact.
This axiom is equivalent to Block-Marschak (1960) polynomials non-negativity condition
(equivalently Total Monotonicity) only for the case of the default alternative probability of
choice.2 We are ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. A complete stochastic choice dataset admits a Random Categorization rule (RC)
representation if and only if it satisfies Axiom (1) -Acyclicity- and Axiom (2) -WDMP-.
It turns out, that the WDMP and the Acyclicity condition imply the Total Monotonicity
condition/Block-Marschak regularity for all alternatives a ∈ X ∪ {o}.3 This fact, makes the RC
rule a special case of RUM.
Corollary 1. A complete stochastic choice dataset admits that admits a RC representation also
admits a RUM representation.
Remark. We believe that the RC rule has one important advantage with respect to the more gen-
eral RUM, that is its improved recoverability properties that will be apparent in the sequel and
its compatibility with a fundamental cognitive process in decision making such as categorization.
4.2 Recoverability
The results set out hereunder are derived trivially from theorem (1).
Corollary 2. In a complete stochastic choice dataset generated by the RC rule, the categories
D ⊆ 2X and the probability of consideration m : D 7→ [0, 1] are recovered uniquely.
The uniqueness is a consequence of defining m as a Mobius inverse that is always unique, as
is detailed in the last part of the proof of theorem (1).
Corollary 3. In a complete stochastic choice dataset generated by the RC rule, we can recover
a set of injective utility functions U that represent the each element of the transitive closure of
the relation .
Now we establish the sufficient condition for the recoverability of the injective utility up to
a monotone transformation.
Axiom 4. -Totality.  is total if and only if for any a, b ∈ X a  b or b  a.
Recall that  is a stochastic revealed preference relation on the finite set X, thus -totality
is a testable restriction on the stochastic choice. Totality means that all items are related among
them by the psychological precedence captured by .
Corollary 4. In a complete stochastic choice dataset generated by the RC rule, that satisfies
Axiom (4) we can recover an injective utility function u up to a monotone transformation (i.e., if
the data admits an RC (u,m,D) representation it also admits an RC (f ◦u,m,D) representation
where f : R 7→ R is a monotone function).
2The axiom is stated using the quantifier ∀n ≥ 1, for the sake of generality because the representation can be
readily extended to countable choice sets. Note that in contrast with Block-Marschak (1960) polynomials, these
differences are well defined for some cases where X is infinite (e.g. when it is a locally compact Hausdorff second
countable space like Rd).
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Axiom 3. (Total Monotonicity) For all a ∈ X ∪ {o}, A ∈ M, such that a ∈ A and any {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn the
successive differences are non-negative ∆An · · ·∆A1p(a,A) ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 1.
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5 Beyond Random Utility: Generalized Random Catego-
rization
Here we study a generalization of the RC rule that is characterized uniquely by the acyclicity
of the stochastic revealed preference relation  (Axiom 1) and is a different model from RUM.
This generalization is of interest because it allows for violations of regularity. The main change
is that we allow the DM to have a signed measure defined over her mental categories instead of a
probability distribution m discussed above. We say that µ : D 7→ R is a signed measure defined
over mental categories if and only if
∑
D∈D µ(D) = 1. We interpret µ(D) > 0 as a propensity
to consider a category while µ(D) ≤ 0 measures the avoidance of a category.
Definition 5. (General Random Categorization rule -GRC-) A stochastic choice dataset has a
General Random Categorization rule representation if there is a triple u, µ and D that are the
injective utility function, the signed measure of consideration map, and the mental categories
respectively, such that the probability of choosing a ∈ X in a menu A ∈ M, is the sum of the
propensities of all categories that produce a consideration set where a ∈ A is the best element
available:
pGRC(a,A) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
µ(D).
Finally, the probability to choose the default is pGRC(o,A) =
∑
A∩D=∅ µ(D).
Summarizing, under the GRC rule the probability of choosing an item is sum of propensities
of mental categories where the fixed item is the best available alternative.
Theorem 2. A stochastic random choice dataset can be generated by a General Random Cate-
gorization rule (GRC) if and only if it satisfies Axiom (1).
Surprisingly the recoverability properties of the GRC model are the same as the RC model,
so we refer to the reader to the previous section in regard to this matter.
The model is able to accommodate violations of the regularity condition, or the restriction
that p(a,A∪{a, b}) ≤ p(a,A∪{a}) for all a, b ∈ X and all A ∈M. This is a necessary condition
for the RUM.
Example 5. (Regularity Violations) The following DM faces the following set of alternatives:
three cars (models) X = {a, b, c}. The first car, a, has two attributes: it has the positive
attribute of a low price and the negative attribute of high fuel consumption. The second car, b,
has high performance but also shares with a the high fuel consumption. Finally, c is consider
low fuel consumption. The corresponding categories associated with this attributes are D =
{{a}, {b}, {a, b}, {c}} with the signed-measure µ({a}) = 23 , µ({a, b}) = − 13 , µ({b}) = 13 , µ({c}) =
1
3 which correspond to the propensities both positive and negative of each mental category. We
assume that u(a) > u(b) > u(c); this reflects preferences over the car models themselves. We
first observe the probability of choosing something different from the default: pGRC(a, {a}) = 13 ,
pGRC(b, {b}) = 0, pGRC(c, {c}) = 13 . The case of the second alternative has a probability of
zero because the DM prefers not to buy a car or to buy the default alternative when faced with
only b. When the DM faces {a, b} as alternatives, then the probability of choosing b increases.
This happens in the GRC model because of the interaction of the utility and the categories
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weights, since u(a) > u(b) it receives in the mind of the DM the weight of being the high fuel
consumption car when making the choice. Thus a distracts from b the bad attribute because
it is in the top of DM’s mind. Formally, pGRC(b, {a, b}) = 13 while pGRC(a, {a, b}) = 13 , and so
we have pGRC(b, {a, b}) > pGRC(b, {b}) which is a violation of regularity. This implies that this
model cannot be accommodated by a RUM.
6 Relation with Models of Stochastic Consideration Sets
The present work has explored a new model of random choice generated by a randomization
process over categories. This produces a random consideration set that is then combined with a
preference relation to produce a choice; in that sense, it generalizes the seminal work of Manzini
and Mariotti (2014). In fact, the RC model nests the random consideration set of MM. Also, this
model is related to the recent work of Brady and Rehbeck (2014); however the RC is not nested
in their contribution. The RC model is nested in the Random Utility representation because
it implies Total Monotonicity. The RC rule shares some similarities with the “Elimination by
Aspects” choice rule described in Tversky (1972) but it is not nested in such model because
RC can be shown to fail weak stochastic transitivity. This feature makes the RC rule able to
accommodate the match-up effect.
The work of Fudenberg et al. (2013) proposes a tractable model of random utility based on
optimization of expected utility that is perturbed by a non-linear additive term; again the RC
model is not nested in their model because of the failure of stochastic transitivity. The work
(Perception Adjusted Luce Model PALM) by Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid (2013) differs
from the RC framework in that PALM concerns itself with intensities of random utility rather
than random consideration sets. They also have a form of acyclicity condition on a revealed
priority of perception relation (a hazard rate) however the RC model is not nested in PALM
and vice-verse because RC allows for degenerate probabilistic choice rule (beyond the outside
option). Moreover, RC does not nest the Luce model but PALM does. Recently, Zhang (2016)
proposes an empirically different categorization procedure that produces stochastic choice. The
author establishes that his rule is different from the previous versions of the categorization rule
presented in this paper (Aguiar, 2015a,b). The reader ought to compare the similarities.
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) Stochastic Consideration Sets
The RC rule nests the MM model. The reader can quickly check that MM axioms imply
our conditions but ours do not imply their axioms. The main differences is the possibility
of accommodating violations of the i-Independence axiom, that is a form of menu independence
consideration.
Definition 6. (i-Independence) For all a, b ∈ X and all A,B ∈ M: p(a,A\{b})p(a,A) = p(a,B\{b})p(a,B) and
p(o,A\{b})
p(o,A) =
p(o,B\{b})
p(o,B) .
Notice that i-Asymmetry and i-Indepence in MM imply Axiom (2) and Axiom (1) but the
converse is not true, so MM model is nested in RC.
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Menu Dependence and Random Feasibility
Interestingly, another model that nests MM, provided by Brady and Rehbeck (2014), the Menu
Dependent Stochastic Consideration -MDSC-, (also renamed as Random Feasibility) (Brady &
Rehbeck, 2014, 2015) is not nested in RC nor is RC nested in their model. Evidently, the
intersection of their contribution and the RC rule is non-empty. The axiom of MDSC that can
be shown to fail in general in our set-up is as follows:
Definition 7. Axiom ASI (Asymmetric Sequential Independence): For all distinct a, b ∈ X,
exactly one of the following holds.
p(a, {a, b}) = p(a, {a})p({a, o}, {a, b}) or p(b, {a, b}) = p(b, {b})p({b, o}, {a, b}).
Claim 1. RC is not nested in the MDSC.
7 Conclusion
We have presented and characterized a new model of stochastic choice that deals with a DM with
bounded rationality. Otherwise rational and deterministic choices are mediated by a random
categorizing procedure. We have provided (necessary and sufficient) conditions under which an
observer can infer standard rational preferences from a standard stochastic choice dataset and
also recover uniquely the random categorization devices. This new model of random choice nests
the deterministic rational choice model and the MM random consideration set model.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem (1)
Before stating the proof of Theorem (1) we need the following lemmata and some preliminaries.
Definition 8. (A Random Consideration Set and Hitting Functional) A Random Set Γ(X) is
a random mapping that takes values on the set of categories D defined on X with probability of
having a non-empty intersection with any given menu A ∈M is given by T (A) = P(Γ(X)∩A 6=
∅) =∑D∩A6=∅:D∈Dm(D) (we call T : 2X 7→ [0, 1] the hitting functional).
Lemma 1. A RC rule can be equivalently represented by Random Set Hitting Functional, where
pRC(a,A) = P(Γ(X) ∩ {a} 6= ∅; Γ(X) ∩BA(a) = ∅), where P(Γ(X) ∩ {a} 6= ∅; Γ(X) ∩BA(a) =
∅) = T (BA(a) ∪ {a})− T (BA(a)) and pRC(o,A) = P(Γ(X) ∩A = ∅) = 1− T (A).
Proof. This is done by direct computation, notice that:
T (BA(a) ∪ {a})− T (BA(a)) =
∑
(BA(a)∪{a})∩D 6=∅m(D)−
∑
BA(a)∩D 6=∅m(D), thus
T (BA(a)∪{a})−T (BA(a)) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D), because T (A) =
∑
D∩A6=∅:D∈Dm(D).
Lemma 2. The Hitting Functional T is totally monotone, such that for any A ∈ M and any
{Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn the successive differences are non-positive ∆An · · ·∆A1T (A) ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 1.
Moreover, its first difference ∆BT (A) for any B ∈ M is such that for any {Bi}ni=1 ∈ Mn the
successive differences ∆Bn · · ·∆B1∆BT (A) ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. Notice that ∆An · · ·∆A1T (A) = −P(Γ(X)∩A 6= ∅; Γ(X)∩Ai = ∅∀i = 1, · · · , n) ≤ 0, and
∆Bn · · ·∆B1∆BT (A) = −P(Γ(X)∩A 6= ∅; Γ(X)∩B = ∅; Γ(X)∩Bi = ∅∀i = 1, · · · , n) ≤ 0.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem (1).
Proof. If a stochastic choice dataset is generated by a RC rule then by lemma (1) we know
that there is a random set Γ(X) defined on 2X with hitting functional such that pRC(a,A) =
T (BA(a)∪{a})−T (BA(a)) = −∆{a}T (BA(a)) and pRC(o,A) = 1−T (A). Then by lemma (2) it
follows that for a fixed a ∈ X, and any A ∈M such that a ∈ A, ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1∆{a}pRC(a,A) =
∆An−1 · · ·∆A1∆{a}T (BA(a)) ≥ 0 for all {Ai}ni=1 ∈Mn for all n ≥ 1, also ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1pRC(o,A) =
∆An−1 · · ·∆A1T (A) ≥ 0 for all {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn for all n ≥ 1. This is exactly Axiom (2) or
WDMP. Now, we deal with  Acyclicity or Axiom (1) necessity. Notice that if we observe
b  a that is pRC(a,A ∪ {b}) < pRC(a,A) it means that T (BA∪{b}(a) ∪ {a})− T (BA∪{b}(a)) <
T (BA(a) ∪ {a})− T (BA(a)) this can only be true if b ∈ BA∪{b}(a) or equivalently u(b) > u(a).
This means that if we observe b  a this implies that u(b) > u(a), thus further implying that 
is acyclic, because u is an injective utility (no indifference).
If a stochastic choice dataset satisfies Axiom (1), namely acyclicity of  and Axiom (2) or the
WDMP condition then we can build a RC rule that generates the dataset. The main part of the
rest of the proof is to use Axiom (2) to set the candidate hitting functional ϕ(A) = 1− p(o,A)
and to notice that by this axiom ϕ : 2X 7→ [0, 1] is a totally monotone Choquet capacity by
definition. In particular, for any A ∈ M and any {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn the successive differences
are non-positive ∆An · · ·∆A1ϕ(A) ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 1. Set the value of ϕ(∅) = 0 without loss
of generality. This is the candidate capacity to generate the stochastic choice dataset. Using
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Axiom (1) I build the revealed upper contour set or the transitive closure of  (call it ∗) that
is guaranteed to exists, pick any of these as the preference order, for all a ∈ X: B∗A (a) = {b ∈
A|b ∗ a}. Now, I have to check if p(a,A) = ϕ(B∗A (a) ∪ {a}) − ϕ(B
∗
A (a)). By Axiom (1),
this is indeed the case. Notice, that we can set p(a,A) = p(o,B
∗
A (a)) − p(o,B
∗
A (a) ∪ {a})
which provides the desired result. To see this is true, observe that by definition of B
∗
A (a), we
have p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a) ∪ {a}) = p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)). Assume not, then by Axiom (1) it must
be the case that p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)) 6= p(B
∗
A (a), [B
∗
A (a) ∪ {a}]) but in that case this means
that there is an element b ∈ B∗A (a) such that a ∗ b which is a contradiction of Axiom (1).
Then, p(a, [B
∗
A (a)∪{a}]) = p([B
∗
A (a)∪{a}], [B
∗
A (a)∪{a}])−p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)) and p(a,A) =
p(a, [B
∗
A (a)∪{a}]), and by definition p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)) = 1−p(o,B
∗
A (a)). Thus we have build
a pair (ϕ,) that generates the data. The final step is to construct the RC rule from the pair
(ϕ,∗). First we construct the utility function u : X 7→ R, the transitive closure of , that we
called ∗ is a linear order as such it can be represented by an injective utility. We enumerate the
elements of X according to∗ such that X = {ai}ni=1 with ai ∗ ai+1 for all i = 1, · · · , n−1, then
let u(ai) = i. Now we build the propensity of consideration map, to do so we use the dual Mobius
inverse of ϕ, in fact we propose m(D) =
∑
A⊆D:D∈M(−1)|D\A|(1 − ϕ(X\A)) as the candidate,
to verify that this is indeed a probability we use Axiom (2) such that ϕ is totally monotone, thus
by Chateauneuf & Jaffray (1989) it is the case that m(D) ≥ 0 and ∑D∈Mm(D) = 1. Observe
that m is defined uniquely in terms of the dataset and ϕ, because it is the dual Mobius inverse
of ϕ. Finally we set the categories collection as the support of m, D ={A ∈ M : m(A) > 0}.
We end the proof by noticing that p(a,A) =
∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D) for BA(a) = {b ∈ A :
u(b) > u(a)} because ∑
{a}∩D 6=∅;BA(a)∩D=∅:D∈D
m(D) = ϕ(B
∗
A (a) ∪ {a})− ϕ(B
∗
A (a)).
8.2 Proof of Corollary (1)
Proof. We prove that a complete stochastic choice dataset generated by a RC rule satisfies total
monotonicity. By lemma (2) it follows that for a fixed a ∈ X, and any A ∈ M such that
a ∈ A, ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1∆{a}pRC(a,A) = ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1∆{a}T (BA(a)) ≥ 0 for all {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn
for all n ≥ 1, also ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1pRC(o,A) = ∆An−1 · · ·∆A1T (A) ≥ 0 for all {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Mn
for all n ≥ 1. This is exactly Total Monotonicity. Finally because Total Monotonicity holds
by Falmagne (1978) we conclude that the complete stochastic choice dataset admits a RUM
representation.
8.3 Proof of Theorem (2)
Before stating the proof we need a preliminary definitions and results.
Definition 9. (Attention capacity) An attention capacity is a map ϕ : 2X 7→ [0, 1] such that:
(i) (proper) 0 ≤ ϕ(A) ≤ 1 for all A ∈ 2X , (ii) (monotone) ϕ(A) ≤ ϕ(B) for all A ⊆ B ∈M.
The attention capacity is also known as a monotone Choquet set capacity. With this in hand
we define the following probabilistic choice representation.
Definition 10. (Fuzzy Attention Model -FAM) It is a probabilistic choice rule pϕ,∗ , induced
by a pair (ϕ,∗) where ϕ is an attention capacity and ∗ is a strict rational preference such
that for any a ∈ A pϕ,∗(a,A) = ϕ(B∗A (a) ∪ {a}) − ϕ(B
∗
A (a)) and pϕ,∗(o,A) = 1 − ϕ(A)
(with B
∗
A (a) = {b ∈ A : b ∗ a}).
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Lemma 3. A stochastic choice dataset is generated by a FAM if and only if Axiom (1) holds.
Proof. If the DM is using a FAM then it satisfies the Axiom (1) trivially. The main part of the rest
of the proof is to set a candidate attention capacity as ϕ(A) = 1−p(o,A) that defines a mapping
over the whole power set ϕ : 2X 7→ [0, 1], this is a Choquet capacity by definition. Set the value
of ϕ(∅) = 0 without loss of generality. This is the candidate capacity to generate the stochastic
choice dataset. Using Axiom (1) I build the revealed upper contour set or the transitive closure of
 ( call it ∗) that is guaranteed to exists, pick any of these as the preference order, for all a ∈ X:
B
∗
(a) = {b ∈ X|b ∗ a}. Now, I have to check if p(a,A) = ϕ(B∗A (a) ∪ {a}) − ϕ(B
∗
A (a)).
Now, using Axiom (1) we show this is the case. Notice, that we can set p(a,A) = p(o,B
∗
A (a))−
p(o,B
∗
A (a)∪{a}) which provides the desired result. To see this is true, observe that by definition
of B
∗
(a), we have p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)∪{a}) = p(B
∗
A (a),B
∗
A (a)). Assume not, then by Axiom
(1) it must be the case that p(B
∗
(a) ∩ A,B∗(a) ∩ A) 6= p(B∗(a) ∩ A, [B∗(a) ∪ {a}] ∩ A)
but in that case this means that there is an element b ∈ B∗(a) such that a ∗ b which is a
contradiction of Axiom (1). Then, p(a, [B
∗
(a) ∪ {a}] ∩ A) = p([B∗(a) ∪ {a}] ∩ A, [B∗(a) ∪
{a}]∩A)− p(B∗(a)∩A,B∗(a)∩A) and p(a,A) = p(a, [B∗(a)∪{a}]∩A), and by definition
p(B
∗
(a)∩A,B∗(a)∩A) = 1−p(o,B∗(a)∩A). Finally, we notice that due to the probability
axioms that imply that p(a,A) ≥ 0 for all a,A we conclude that the candidate Choquet capacity
is monotone thus being an attention capacity. We have build a FAM or a pair (ϕ,∗) that
generates the data.
Proof. We are going to prove that the following are equivalent.
(i) The complete stochastic choice dataset satisfies Axiom (1).
(ii) The complete stochastic choice dataset admits a FAM representation.
(iii) The complete stochastic choice dataset admits a GRC representation.
First, we prove that (i) iff (ii). This is established in lemma (3)
Second we prove that if (ii) holds then (iii) follows.
If a complete stochastic choice dataset admits a FAM (ϕ,∗) representation then we can
build a GRC (u,D,m) representation by building a injective utility function u : X 7→ R such
that u(a) > u(b) ⇐⇒ a ∗ b. Then we build µ : 2X 7→ R using the Mobius inversion such that
m(D) =
∑
A⊆D:D∈M(−1)|D\A|(1 − ϕ(X\A)), we let D = {D ∈ 2X : µ(D) 6= 0}. It is easy to
check that ϕ(A ∪ {b}) − ϕ(A) = ∑b∩D 6=∅,A∩D=∅ µ(D) for any A and b, thus establishing that
p∗,ϕ(a,A) =
∑
a∩D 6=∅;BuA(a)∩D=∅ µ(D) for B
u
A(a) = {b ∈ A|u(b) > u(a)} can be generated by
the constructed GRC rule. Finally, we prove that (iii) implies (ii). This follows immediately
by noticing that we can build an attention capacity from a signed-measure over categories as
follows: ϕ(A) =
∑
D∩A6=∅ µ(D). We can build ∗ on top of the utility u.
8.4 Proof of Claim (1)
Proof. I use the same setup that in example (2).
(i) Observe pRC(b, {a, b}) = m({b, d}), p(b, {b}) = m({a, c, b})+m({b, d}) and pRC({b, o}, {a, b}) =
m({b, d}). (ii) pRC(a, {a, b}) = m({a}) + m({a, c, b}), pRC(a, {a}) = m({a, c, b}) + m({a}) and
pRC({a, o}, {a, b}) = m({a, c, b}) + m({a}). (i) and (ii) imply that in general the RC rule does
not satisfy the asymmetric sequential axiom ASI axiom.
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